CHAPTER V

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE HEARTLANDS

          As we saw in Chapter IV, the Soviet Union has acquired influence and facilities in a number of countries on the immediate periphery of the Middle East. In this chapter we will consider the ongoing rivalry between the superpowers in the heartlands of the area - that is to say, in Egypt and Libya, Syria and Iraq.

          The first thing to be said is that, whatever their relations with one or other of the superpowers, these states cannot be described as clients. In fact, the past quarter-century in the Middle East has seen a movement toward true political and economic independence.

          It follows that each of these major Arab states, in positioning itself in relation to the superpowers, does so in the light of its perception of its national interests.

          On balance, the United States has done better than the Soviet  Union out of this situation. To most of the inhabitants of the heartlands, the Soviet Union seems the greater threat. This is because of the Soviet Union's immediate physical proximity to the area; because of the existence and activities of local communist parties taking orders from Moscow; because of a dislike for a socialistic economic system, and finally because Marxist materialism runs counter to the strongly held Islamic beliefs of most Arabs. But Soviet aid, trade and arms over more than two decades have undoubtedly won Moscow a presence in the area.

Egypt

          Since the Free Officers came to power in 1952, Egypt has been the  main Middle East battlefield for superpower competition. The United States favored the emergence of the young officers and encouraged their efforts to rid Egypt of the last traces of British control (notably the British army in the Canal Zone). But relations worsened with President Nasser turned to Russia for arms in 1955.

          The supply of arms gave the Soviet Union a preferential position in Arab politics for the next 18 years-right up to the October War of 1973.¹ Association with the Soviet Union led to the steady radicalization of Nasser's regime. It led to sharp hostility between Egypt and more moderate Arab states. And finally, in combination with American support for Israel, if led to a serious breach between Egypt and the United States.

          The defeat of 1967 discredited Nasser's policies, both internal and external, forcing on his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, a wide-ranging reappraisal and re-orientation of Egypt's domestic and international postures.

          In the 10 years since Nasser's death, President Sadat has swung Egypt from heavy dependence on Moscow to heavy dependence on Washington. This 180-degree swing was not accomplished overnight. It's principal stages were:

          -the expulsion from Egypt of over 20,000 Soviet military personnel  in 1972 (a decisive move in which Sadat had the encouragement of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia);

          - the 1973 war, which was a deliberate attempt to break the stalemate of Arab-Israeli conflict and open the way to peace;  - Egypt's acceptance of Dr. Kissinger's disengagement proposals in 1973-1975;

          - and finally the adoption of President Carter's peace strategy, culminating in the Camp David accords and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of March 1979.

          The five main underlying reasons for the reorientation introduced  by President Sadat were:

          - the exhaustion of the Egyptian economy and people after 18 years  of Nasser's regime and thirty years of conflict;

          - the Egyptian army's dissatisfaction with the quality of the Soviet arms received and friction with Soviet advisers. It was generally believed that the Soviet Union was refusing to supply Egypt with the offensive weapons it needed to have a chance to win;

          - the conviction that only the United States had sufficient leverage  on Israel to bring about peace on terms the Arabs could accept. Already in 1967, Saudi Arabia, together with Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan had all stressed to President Nasser that the key to influence over Israel lay in American hands. It fell to President Sadat to adopt this policy.

          - Egypt's wish to improve relations with Saudi Arabia and other oil producing states of the Peninsula after the strains created by the Yemen war of the 1960's;

          - finally, the need to liberalize the Egyptian economy and encourage private-enterprise, stifled during the Nasser era.²

The Current Balance Sheet

          From Washington's point of view, the new friendship of Egypt is a net gain, reversing the trend of Soviet penetration of the Arab heartlands of the past 25 years.

          This improvement in the strategic balance had implications for the better defense of U.S. security interests, not only in Egypt and the Middle East, but also in Africa, where Egypt has shown its willingness to be active.

          It is clear that the Egyptian armed forces are being re-equipped and retrained with American help for a new regional role, which is, likely to include confronting Soviet proxy forces in the African continent south of the Sahara.

          U.S. military credits of $1.5 billion are being used to finance an ambitious three-year program which, when complete, will include the delivery of 35 F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers and 806 M-113 armored personnel carriers, and they are now in the process of buying F-16 and probably F-15 aircraft. Already Egyptian forces have been given greater mobility by the delivery of C-130 Hercules transport aircraft (of which 15 were on display at the military parade on October 6, marking the sixth anniversary of the crossing of the Suez Canal in 1973).³

          Moderate Arab opinion outside Egypt warmly welcomed President  Sadat's steering of Egyp away from the Soviet orbit and closer to the Western democracies. But some aspects of the new Egyptian-American relationship-notably the peace strategy-have caused great concern and have indeed put at risk American security interests in the Middle East.

          The American-sponsored Egypt -Israel Peace Treaty is already a matter of dispute between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The reason that we oppose this treaty is because it neglects the root - the source - of the problem. It must be realized that when Egypt withdrew from the overall Arab Israeli conflict, and reached a separate agreement, with the support of the U.S., this was quite simply a direct attack on Arab national interests and objectives. The issues at stake affect not only Israel and Egypt, but the national interests and destinies of all Arab countries. We cannot afford to agree to issues settled in a forum restricted to Egypt and Israel. Nor can we and the other Arab states concerned join this forum until Israel has agreed to negotiate the withdrawal from all Arab land conquered in 1967, and to allow the Palestinians the right of self determination.

          By encouraging Egypt to "go it alone", the United States has assumed grave responsibilities, first in connection with the Egyptian economy now deprived of Arab funds, and secondly in connection with the extension of the peak process to Israel's other neighbors.

          The permanence of U.S. gains in Egypt cannot be guaranteed. It must be assumed that the Soviet Union views the growth of United States influence on the Nile as a major threat to its own security interests in the area. It will spare no efforts to dislodge the United States, and more particularly to prevent Egypt's "open door" economic policy from succeeding. This is not an idle threat, as the permanence of Egypt's present Western alignment will depend on the medium-term performance of its economy. If the Egyptian people are not given the benefits they have been led to expect from peace, a phase of unpredictable political instability could result.

          Since the U.S. has ignored the Saudi Arabian point of view in regards to Egypt, it must be indicated that it has gravely weakened the Arab position in their national conflict with Israel. Furthermore, it has undercut and severely limited the Saudi position and leadership within the Arab camp. By placing Egypt apart from the other Arab countries, the U.S. has caused divisions to occur in the Arab World. For Saudi Arabia, Muslim unity is the most important priority. No other potential relationship can have the same meaning. Therefore it is clearly in the U.S. interest to restore and preserve this unity by settling the Palestinian problem, including Jerusalem. Otherwise, the U.S. position in the Middle East will be further weakened.

Libya

          Soviet gains in Libya have to some extent offset the erosion of its  position in Egypt under Sadat.

          There is a striking parallelism between the step-by-step build-up of the Soviet-Libyan relationship and the development of U.S.-Egyptian relationships.

          The stages in Libya's cooperation with the Soviet Union were:

          1) March 1972, signature of an agreement for technical cooperation;

          2) May 1974, Premier Jallud visited Moscow to discuss trade, arms, supplies, and policy coordination;

          3) May 1975, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin visited Tripoli and promised Colonel Qadhafi sophisticated weapons including tanks, artillery and Surface-to-Air-Missiles (SAMs);

          4) July 1977, the brief Libyan-Egyptian border war increased Libyan dependence on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union undertook to strengthen Libyan defenses in the Western desert, to increase arms deliveries, to provide Libya with intelligence regarding future Egyptian intentions, and to advise Qadhafi on internal security matters.

          5) Summer 1979, following Libyan interventions in Uganda and Chad, there was wide speculation of an impending Egyptian strike against Libya. This did not materialize, but President Sadat accused Libya of granting the Soviet Union naval and air facilities on its territory - a charge Libya denied.

          There is little doubt that the Soviet Union has gained from this relationship:

          1) it has made hard currency sales of military equipment worth some billions of dollars;

          2) these weapons so far exceed Libya's manpower resources as to arouse speculation that they have been prepositioned in Libya for use by Soviet Union or its proxies elsewhere in the African continent;

          3) The Soviet Union now has a valuable strategic presence in the central Mediterranean area.

          American security interests have been threatened by these developments. Although trade relations continue, political relations between Tripoli and Washington have deteriorated sharply. In December 1979, Washington "suspended" the activities of its mission in Tripoli, following the sacking of its embassy by a mob.

          Although Qadhafi remains a potent threat to America's regional interests in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Africa-Washington can take some comfort from his loss of credibility and increasing isolation in Arab councils.

Iraq

          Since its setback in Egypt, the Soviet Union has paid very considerable attention to Iraq. In April 1972 the two countries signed a 15-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

          In the preceding decade, particularly after the Ba'th came to power in 1968, there was a steady expansion of government-to-government ties. Iraq's policies took on an anti-Western and radical orientation; local communists were given greater tolerance; Iraq's nonalignment was viewed with favor in Moscow.

          Since 1972 the Soviet Union has backed the Ba'th government's de cision to nationalize Western oil holdings, and has lent support to the regime in its war against the Kurds. Above all the Soviet Union has been Iraq's principal source of arms since the 1958 revolution which overthrew the monarchy.

          Common opposition to U.S. Middle East policies, to Sadat's opening  to the West, and to the Egypt-Israel peace treaty have kept Moscow and Baghdad in step.

          On the military front the Soviet navy tas been allowed to show the  flag regularly at Umm Qasr, Iraq's port at the top of the Gulf. But as Umm Qasr lies on a narrow, shallow and windy channel, and as the Soviet Union must request official permission for each visit, access to this port is not a major strategic asset.

          In addition, the Soviet air force has been granted limited access for refueling at Iraqi airfields.

          However, serious tensions have arisen in the Soviet-Iraqi relationship.

          1) The Iraqi regime has begun to diversify its arms suppliers and now buys from Western Europe as well as the Soviet Union.

          2) Baghdad also looks increasingly to the West for major imports of technology and equipment, although its economic ties with Russia remain extensive.

          3) Iraq's long-standing refusal to accept UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem has been a cause of strain.

          4) In the Horn of Africa, Iraq supports Eritrean separatists against the Moscow-backed Ethiopian regime.

          5) Moscow has been angered by the Ba'th government's execution of communists accused of organizing party cells in army units.

          Recent events in Iran could have a disturbing effect on Soviet-Iraqi relations. Moscow's traditional policy has been to develop friendly relations with both Iran and Iraq, without taking sides. However, the weakening of the central government in Tehran after the overthrow of the Shah, nationalist rebellions in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, the increasingly anti-American policies of the Khomeini regime, Soviet dependence on Iranian natural gas, and the improved political prospects for the Tudeh (communist) Party may all lead Moscow to give Iran greater priority over Iraq.

          In recent years American trade with Iraq has provided the basis for  a modest improvement in relations. But mistrust remains on both sides. Undoubtedly Iraq would like to play a wider role in Arab politics, and more particularly in the Gulf, now that the restraint imposed on it by the Shah has been removed, and that Egypt has defected from Arab ranks.

          These Iraqi ambitions are a potential threat to U.S. security interests in the Middle East, linked as these interests are to the stability of the region and to the uninterrupted flow of oil.

          Already a strong military power in the Gulf, Iraq has announced plans to expand its navy. While welcoming this addition to Arab strength, other states in the Arabian Peninsula are seeking to build up their own forces as a guarantee of their future independence. U.S. security interests would best be served by a balance of power in this vital area, rather than in the superiority of any one state.

Syria

          Syria under President Asad has been anxious to maintain an independent posture toward both superpowers. However, its relations with the Soviet Union are strong. Russia is its principal arms supplier and Syria favors Soviet participation in a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem.

          For its part, the Soviet Union attributes great importance to Syria  as a counterweight to Egypt in the confrontation with Israel, and as a regional power with influence extending into Lebanon, Jordan, and over the Palestine Liberation Organization.

          In spite of this close and mutually supportive relationship, Syria has steadfastly refused to sign a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union, or to grant the Soviet navy the extensive repair and re-supply facilities it has repeatedly requested at Latakia and Tartus - to replace those it lost in Egypt.

          Moreover, the Syrian Communist Party is held on a very tight rein by President Asad's regime, although it is a nominal member of the Progressive National Front, a grouping of political factions dominated by the Ba'th Party.

          Syria has correct relations with the United States, and Washington was appreciative of Syria's role in pacifying Lebanon, and appreciation marked by President Carter's meeting with President Asad in Geneva in May 1977.

          However, Syria is understandably bitter at President Carter's promotion of the Egypt-Israel treaty, which leaves Syria exposed and vulnerable to Israeli aggression, not only in Lebanon - both on the ground and in the air - but also on its own territory. It is not only the firmly held Syrian view, but also the view of all Arab countries that America's peace policies seriously destabilize the area, by splitting Arab ranks and giving a free rein to Israeli expansionism.

          In such a mood, Syria cannot be expected to be concerned about the defense of American security interests.

          Apart from its opposition to the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, Syria itself is not an immediate danger to American security interest. Indeed, President Asad has been a force for practicality and stability for a decade. But his regime is under threat from Islamic extremists.

          To sum up, while the United States position is strong in Egypt and has improved in Iraq and Syria, the Soviet Union enjoys considerable assets in these two countries and in Libya. Undoubtedly, the unpopularity of Washington's peace strategy is the major obstacle to better American relations, and thereby puts U.S. interests at risk.

 

 

CHAPTER VI

THREATS TO REGIONAL STABILITY

          The basic assumption of this chapter is that American security interests are best served in a stable environment. It will be recalled that regional stability was itself listed at the beginning of this paper as one of the vital interests of the United States, and a precondition for the defense of other U.S. interests. It follows therefore that threats to regional stability must be identified and understood.

          These threats may be identified as follows:

          - the Arab-Israeli conflict

          - inter-Arab confrontations

          - the uneasy relationship between the Arab states and the new revolutionary regime in Iran

          - political activities of Islamic heretics and deviationists

          - the disruptive side-effects on a society of rapid development and modernization

The Arab-Israeli Conflict

          President Carter came to office in January 1977 with the declared  aim of bringing about a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict which had plagued the region for more than 30 years.

          In opting for a comprehensive solution, he seemed to be breaking  with the so-called "step-by-step approach associated with the name of Secretary Kissinger.¹ The regrettable fact, however, is that President Carter's achievements in the field of Middle East peace have fallen far short of his declared intentions.

          As is well known, he made great efforts to bring about a separate Egyptian-Israeli peace, which the rest of the Arab world has unanimously condemned as a partial, divisive, even treacherous settlement. It satisfies only one of the Arab belligerents-Egypt. It leaves Jordan, Syria, and the Palestinians weakened by Egypt's defection. It does not satisfy their legitimate aspirations. It has not restrained Israel, but encouraged it to further colonization of Arab territory.

          Most crucially in the present inquiry, it has generated a powerful current of anti-American feeling throughout the area, owing to the wide spread belief that the United States and Israel have thus considered to divide and subjugate the Arabs. This popular resentment, which periodically explodes uncontrollably, constitutes a continuous threat to American security interests.

          President Carter and his advisers and spokesmen put a wholly different interpretation on the results of American peace diplomacy. They believe that a process has been started which will eventually lead to a comprehensive settlement. In the Middle East this argument carries little conviction.

          Some Arab leaders are prepared to give President Carter the benefit of the doubt. They recall his earnest pledge that the Egypt-Israel treaty was "not the end of a process, but a beginning of one . . . an indispensable part of a comprehensive peace".²

          But President Carter will have to move fast, if this pledge is to be  fulfilled, and if the worst fears about his diplomacy are not to be realized. Press commentators have suggested that the pressure of the coming election campaign in the United States will take priority over the unfinished business awaiting him in the Middle East. The transfer of Mr. Robert Strauss from representing the U.S. at the Palestine autonomy talks to Presidents Carter's campaign staff is a signal in this direction.

          Present Arab demands on the Palestine issue are not extreme: they are that Israel withdraw from Arab territory occupied in the 1967 war; that it dismantle illegal settlements on this territory; that it allow the Palestinians political self-expression on this territory; and that it live in peace with its neighbors within secure and recognized boundaries.

          This formula for Middle East peace has been accepted by the overwhelming majority of world opinion. It is the responsibility of the United States, as Israel's main support, to help bring about a settlement on the lines, using its full power and influence.

          Such a policy - vigorously and even - handedly carried out - would be the best defense of U.S. security interests in the Arab and Islamic world.

Inter-Arab Confrontations

          Although united on fundamentals, the Arab states are divided by conflicts of interest, rivalries for influence, and ideological differences.

          Among the current disputes are the Algerian-Moroccan conflict over the fate of the Western Sahara; the tensions between Egypt and Libya; the antagonism (occasionally patched up) between the two wings of the Ba'th Party ruling Syrian and Iraq; the confrontation between the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, divided as they are by profoundly different social and political systems.

          The Arab country which has suffered most from regional stresses is Lebanon, where a civil war between local factions acquired wider dimensions by the involvement of other states.

          The tragedy of Lebanon illustrates many disruptive problems: the statelessness and desperation of the Palestinians; the fears of minority communities such as the Maronites; the ideological conflicts between sectarian groups and parties; the problem of integrating communities which have been profoundly influenced by Europe over many generations into an Arab hinterland seeking to affirm its own identity; the conflict between a rich urban middle class and an impoverished peasantry, which for many years now has borne the brunt of Israeli aggression.

          The destruction of Lebanon is one dimension of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Peace and stability can only return to that country when the dispute is settled. To this extent the Lebanese problem has escaped Arab control, and requires the constructive intervention of an external power. The responsibility of the United States extends as much to Lebanon as it does to the Arab-Israeli dispute itself.

          Before the civil war, Lebanon was rightly considered to be a strong point of Western influence and a showcase of Western values. The breakdown of the Lebanese system must be judged a severe blow to Western and U.S. security interests, and its reconstruction should figure high on Western priorities.

          The United States can exert less influence on the other inter-Arab disputes listed above. However, it is in U.S. interests to support the efforts of Arab states such as Saudi Arabia which seek to resolve these conflicts by peaceful means.

Arab-Iranian Relations

          The revolution which Iran is experiencing affects the Arab world in many different ways.

          1) There is the danger that some Iranian leaders will seek to export their revolution to neighboring Arab states.

          2) More particularly, there is the ferment and unrest aroused in Arab Shi'a³ communities by the speeches and activities of Iranian Shi'a Feaders.

          3) The upsurge of local autonomous aspirations in Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, following on the weakening of central government in Tehran, creates a problem for neighboring Arab states, such as Iraq, which also contain minority communities.

          4) The Iranian revolution has revived certain specific issues which oppose Iran to its Arab neighbors. These include the treatment of the Arabic-speaking peoples of Iranian Khuzistan (Arabistan); Iranian claims to Bahrain, as well as the future of three small islands in the Gulf (the Greater and Lesser Tumb and Abu Musa) seized by the Shah in 1971; and the general issue of Gulf security.

          5) The Iranian-U.S. dispute, sharpened by the seizure of hostages  in the American embassy in Tehran, has very grave consequences for Arab states bordering the Gulf. The dispute increases regional tensions, threatens the area with armed conflict, and carries with it the constant danger of an interruption to the oil-flow.

          Equally, the Iranian-U.S. dispute - and the way it is resolved - has grave consequences for the United States' future credibility, influence and posture in the region. If the dispute is resolved peacefully, and to the United States' satisfaction, this will ease the task of those Arab states which would like to cooperate with the United States in stabilizing the area to the benefit of all.

Revolutionism in Iran

          The Islamic world is facing a very considerable challenge from   the so-called Islamic regime in Tehran, which is destroying the true image of Islam. Islam throughout its history has meant peace, tolerance, brotherhood, submission to the law of God - not fanaticism, the imprisonment of innocent hostages for whatever reason, and the spread of subversion. Such un-Islamic behavior is not only a grave threat to Western interests in the area, but it is also slowing down the efforts of those Muslims who wish to see Islamic society take its proper place in the modern world. Indeed, they are against the very heart of Islamic teaching. The improper use of Islam to retard progress, crush development, and spread chaos and violence must be opposed by all possible means.

          As is well-known; Islam is more than a religion. It is a way of life encompassing all mans activities - social, economic and political. It is our ambition in Saudi Arabia to bring about a flowering of Islamic society to equal the great civilizations of Arab history.

          It is in this constructive sense that we see Islam, not in the destructive, subversive sense preached by some contemporary Imams. We are confident that we are acting in our historical tradition. As an American scholar has written:

          The historical development of Islam illustrates that, by the force of its doctrine and by the wide scope of its concerns - psychological, social, economic, legal and political - Islam has been an enormously significant integrating force for the Arabs.⁴

The Impact of Modernization

          It is a commonplace that oil revenues have transformed the physical and social environment of the producing states. Wealth has resulted in rapid modernization, but also in a profound disruption of the traditional way of life. Every Arab is aware of the tremendous changes which have occurred in our lifetime, not only in the physical environment in which we now live but also in attitudes and ways of thinking. Undoubtedly we have experienced a profound break with the past.⁵

          In the five years after the great surge in oil prices of 1973-1974, many Arab leaders have begun to question the wisdom of over-rapid and under-controlled development. Conservation-both of oil resources and of the traditional environment - now attracts growing support. It is increasingly recognized that the evil social effects of rapid economic growth - inflation, migration to the cities, congestion, pollution, the destruction of family and tribal bonds - can themselves pose a serious threat to stability.

          Development in the Arab oil states is largely taking place in partnership with the West, and with its active encouragement. The time has come for Western governments and companies, together with the Arab oil states, to review the pace and scope of development programs, with an eye to their societal effects.

          It is no exaggeration to say that the defense of U.S. security interests lies in the orderly, harmonious, and peaceful growth of Arab economies.

 

 

CHAPTER VII

A NEW REGIONAL STRATEGY:

SCOPE FOR U.S.-SAUDI COOPERATION

          It is now widely recognized that the so-called Third World has become a major arena for superpower competition. This competition is at its fiercest in that belt of territory stretching from Southern Africa to Southern Asia which President Carter's Security Adviser, Dr. Brzezinski, has described as an "arc of crisis".

          At the apex of this arc lies the Middle East, a region which, because of its oil resources and strategic location, is of special importance in the superpower contest.

Declining Superpower Control

          The history of the Third World in recent years has shown a growth  in the number and scope of regional conflicts. As a result, both the United States and the Soviet Union have devoted great attention to the problem of the "management" of their rivalry in an increasingly turbulent world.

          The Soviet Union has responded to this challenge by a vast build-up of its military forces and by giving itself the capability to intervene in Third World conflicts many thousands of miles from its borders by means of naval power and airborne forces. As we have seen, it has also acquired strategic assets on the periphery of the Middle East, in the form of naval and air facilities and client political regimes. However, it has used these assets cautiously, and with a concern to avoid confrontations, either with the U.S. or with local states.

          2) In the event of strictly internal political disorder in a Middle Eastern State, the U.S. would not be prepared to use force. In the words of Secretary Brown: "These are not responsibilities of the United States, and particularly not of the U.S. military". In the words of Secretary Vance: "Let me state . . . that the use of military force is not, and should not be, a desirable American policy response to the internal politics of other nations. We believe we have the right to shape our destiny, we must respect that right in others".

          3) However, the U.S. must be ready to respond with appropriate force to any direct Soviet military action, or to an external attack against a friendly state which calls on it for assistance.

          Such appears to be the conceptual basis of American thinking.

A More Assertive U.S. Posture

          This year's Afghan and Iranian crises and the sharper U.S. perception of the threat to oil supplies have led to pressure in the U.S. Administration for a more assertive strategic posture in the Middle East/Indian Ocean region.

          In an important policy declaration on August 2, Dr. Brzezinski declared that the Middle East was a "vital strategic zone" on a par with Western Europe and the Far East. He said that the United States must have the military power to protect its vital interests in this zone, and was working to increase its military capabilities and "nearby military presence".

          He declared: "We must assure that we have the reach and the means to project our power where it is needed and to do so in the appropriate form and level of intensity".²

          This statement must be taken as a declaration of future intent rather than a description of present capabilities. It should not read as a major departure from the principles set out above.

          Among the options which the U.S. Administration is understood to be considering in the wake of the Iranian revolution are the following:

          - More frequent deployment of carrier task forces from the Western Pacific into the Indian Ocean;

          - Occasional air missions from the United States or Western Europe to the Middle East;

          - Prepositioning of military supplies in key countries;

          - The creation of a "Rapid Deployment Force" in the United States for coping with sudden crises without having to establish U.S. bases or a new naval fleet in the region.³

          These plans, justified as they are from the point of view of American interests, are easier to formulate than to apply in practice. First, it may not be easy to distinguish between internal dissent and outside intervention in any given country. Secondly, the Arab countries most directly concerned - the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia - are showing increasing reluctance to be overtly linked with U.S. military preparations. The formulation of new "strategic doctrines" without meaningful action will be worthless. We have to work at a new formula for strategic interdependence. It is not true that we do not want friendship with the West; it is not true that we do not need the West's support. Rather, it is a question of finding acceptable modes for this friendship and for this support: modes which are compatible with the need for dignity and independence.

          The conclusions to be drawn from this review of U.S. strategic options is that the prospects are better for the deployment of economic, political and supportive military instruments than for direct military intervention itself.

U.S.-Saudi Partnership

          The United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia share major common interests in the stability of the Middle East; to keep it free from war and violence. Only in a climate of stability can we as an Arab nation, and our Western friends and allies, on whom we depend, reach our full potential and prosperity. A second and very vital interest to both is to keep the Soviets out of the region. A third area of common interest is financial. Because Saudi Arabia has growing surpluses of money, we have a direct interest in the strength of your economy and the dollar, and indeed, the strength of the whole international financial system. Should it collapse, our accumulated surpluses would have no meaning. This would justify the argument which says "we would be better off if we left our oil in the ground". Finally, there is the oil problem itself. The world trend is directed toward conservation and higher prices. But, since we Saudis are committed to a stable world and to the health of the free world's civilization; we have made tremendous efforts to moderate price increases, and the West can be assured that we will continue this effort. We are producing far beyond what is required for our budgetary requirements - we can satisfy our monetary requirements by producing half of the amount of oil we produce now. It is not in the long-term interests, for example, of Saudi Arabia to produce oil at a rate to satisfy the current wasteful consumption of the West.

          Although the relationship is one of mutual interdependence, U.S.and Saudi interests are not always identical. More particularly, identification of Saudi interests with American interests may be unacceptable if this is interpreted as limiting the full exercise of Saudi sovereignty and independence.

          But there are responsibilities which the United States and Saudi  Arabia have a duty to undertake together.

          The first is their joint concern to underpin the world economy and thereby serve the interests of both the Third World and the industrialized countries of Western Europe; Japan and the North American continent.

          The second task is to coordinate efforts to ensure stability and security in the Middle East and its approaches. In this cause a range of collaborative actions is available to the United States in the region.⁴ In peacetime, conditions these would be:

          1) Trade and economic assistance to countries in need, including development of long-term ties and interdependencies;

          2) The military training of friendly nations;

          3) Transfers of weapons;

          4) Transfers of weapon technology and related industrial information;

          5) Joint planning for military action; and

          6) The provision of reconnaissance and intelligence.

          In the event of an armed conflict, these measures could be

supplemented by the following:

          7) Moving mobile forces into position;

          8) Alerting, threatening to use, or demonstrating the missiles that

could be launched from distant bases;

          9) Direct intervention by forces other than land combat troops;

          10) Direct intervention by land combat troops in concert with

other forces; and

          11) The invoking of nuclear guarantees and the alerting of nuclear capable forces.

          Clearly these are theoretical options. Equally clearly it is the duty of countries with common interests to coordinate their strategies to meet the dangers and uncertainties of the 1980s.

The Problem of Palestine

          There is a further vital area in which the United States and Saudi Arabia must work together to protect their interests. I refer to the settlement of the Palestine problem.

          As is well-known, Saudi Arabia does not hold fanatical views on this subject. We do not advocate the destruction of the State of Israel. But we clearly realize - and we would wish our American friends to do likewise - that the Palestinians must be given their national rights, if turmoil in the whole region is to be avoided and Soviet influence is to be checked.

          It is very clear that Israeli stubbornness in denying Palestinian rights on the West Bank and in Gaza has undermined American credibility throughout the whole region and gravely weakened U.S. capability to act resolutely in a regional crisis.

          Many anomalies in U.S. policy on the Palestinian issue must be corrected. For example, the U.S. must negotiate sooner or later with the Palestine Liberation Organization, and not allow its foreign policy to be dictated by Israel. Examples of double standards are too flagrant to pass unnoticed: why is the U.S. pressing for self-determination for black Rhodesians and not for Palestinians? Why is there an uproar over the fate of Soviet Jews, but silence about that of Palestinians under Israeli occupation? Why was Turkey punished by an embargo on military supplies when it invaded Cyprus, but Israel left unpunished and free from embargo when it invaded Lebanon? The most recent example of this flip-flop attitude toward the region is the U.S. voting fiasco at the United Nations on March 8, 1980. At that time, the U.S. Ambassador McHenry voted in favor of the resolution S/13827, which demanded that Israel cease placing new settlements on occupied Arab land, and dismantle those in existence.⁵ Two days later, President Carter repudiated the vote indicating that the U.S. should have abstained. Clearly this act of sharply criticizing Israel for its misdemeanors and ignoring International Law on the one hand, and then seemingiy trying to placate her two days later not only confuses and angers both Israel and the Arab nations, but it also distinctly undercuts any authority and diplomatic endeavors that the Special Middle East Envoy Sol Linowitz may be attempting to accomplish on behalf of the Palestinian inhabitants of these occupied areas.

          As I have already said, unconditional U.S. support for Israel has naturally caused offense to the Arab friends of the United States. The determination to maintain Israeli diplomatic and military superiority (even sometimes at the expense of equipment for America's own armed forces) has necessarily blocked attempts to reach accommodation in the Arab- Israeli conflict. While that conflict remains unsolved, it is a cancer infecting the whole region and threatening, among other things, the security interest of the West in general and the United States in particular. If the question is not resolved, this could have serious implications for a general realignment of the region. If peace is not completed, the solution will remain partial - then, unfortunately, the 1980s could witness most of the Arab world drifting away from the West if these issues are not resolved. The Arab states may well be forced to seek to free themselves from any great power connections.

          After the June War of 1967, Saudi Arabia played a moderating role, helping finance the Arab states which had suffered reverses in that war, bringing the Yemen conflict to an end, and thus saving the area from chaos and shifting the balance from the radicals to the moderates.

          From 1971 this role became even more crucial: from then on Saudi Arabia acted as a broker between Egypt and Syria (neither or which had diplomatic relations with the United States between the June and October wars) and the United States. For example, Saudi persuasion contributed to the expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt in 1972, and to Egypt's introduction of a liberalized economic policy after the 1973 war. After the 1973 war, the United States realized for the first time that Israel was not invincible, and moreover that with its own resources it could wage war only for a few days; and, it has been proven that without the largest airlift that the U.S. has ever mounted in its history, Israel could not have continued the war. Not only was Israel no longer a convincing ally, but clearly it would prove to be in the future a permanent burden on the United States.

          The oil embargo and oil price rises of 1973-1974 derived directly from the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a result, all U.S. policies had to be reconsidered. The first fruits of this rethinking were Dr. Kissinger's peace diplomacy and ex-President Nixon's visit to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Syria in 1974. But the progress towards "even-handedness" had to wait until President Carter came into office. Unfortunately, even today American policy-makers seem unwilling to tackle the root of the problem: the Palestinians' national rights. The Palestinians' claim to a homeland of their own, must, in justice, be granted. Moreover, as long as the world denies the claim, the injustice will remain a source of unrest.

          The so-far unsatisfied, legitimate grievances of the Palestinian people, expelled from their land by Zionist colonizers to become refugees, or living under Israeli military occupation, have created a militant movement, which, in desperation, often turns its guns on Arab host countries. There are some two million Palestinians in the diaspora, many of whom are to be found in the countries of the Arabian Gulf. The precedents of Jordan and Lebanon are enough to demonstrate that these uprooted people can constitute  a grave threat, not only to the countries harbouring them, but to the whole area.

          Perhaps the most severe failing of U.S. policy in defense of its  security interests in the Middle East has been its reluctance to recognize the Palestine problem. The explanation is simple: it lies in the hitherto gross bias with which the United States has viewed Israel, and its myopic view of the causes of the situation; namely, the Palestine problem.

          Saudi Arabia hopes that the Carter Administration's move away from bias and towards even-handedness will continue. If the Arab-Israeli conflict is to be solved, two developments are necessary: (i) Israel's withdrawal from the Arab lands occupied in 1967; and (ii) the provision of a homeland to satisfy Palestinian national aspirations. The United States has gone some way to accept the first of these requirements. It is vital that it should now recognize the urgency of the second, and act upon this recognition. Only then will America's friends be able to rally wholeheartedly to its support in the defense of our many common interests.

 

 

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

          The Middle East is an area of vital interest to the Western world. It is the one region of the world where the Soviet Union could upset the global power balance by securing control of a local asset-oil.

          Since the Second World War, the West has, by and large, managed to limit the growth of Soviet influence within the Middle East and to contain Soviet power on the frontiers of the area.

          But in the late 1970s dangerous, new developments occurred, forcing the United States to discard many old security concepts and to devise new ones to meet the challenges of the 1980s.

          Not only did the Soviet Union manage to secure valuable strategic assets in Ethiopia and the PDRY, but at the end of 1979 it tightened its grip on the periphery of the Middle East by its invasion of Afghanistan. Coming on the heels of the Iranian revolution and the conclusion of the divisive Egypt-Israel peace treaty, this latest Soviet move had profound implications for the defense of the U.S. security interest in the Middle East.

          In response to these multiple challenges, the United States has had to reappraise its posture in the area. The events in Iran, and even more so the invasion of Afghanistan, found Washington largely unprepared. Although powerful at sea, the United States did not have the means to confront Soviet power on land.

          Moreover, U.S. credibility was damaged in Arab eyes by America's long and sustained unlimited support for the State of Israel in its continued occupation and colonization of Arab territory. As a result, even America's closest Arab friend found it difficult, if not impossible, to come out boldly in support of U.S. policies.

          But external threats to the area from the Soviet Union and its proxies are not the only potential dangers to the Arab world.

          It is the ambition of every Arab state to modernize its society and improve the well-being of its people. But if the process of modernization is too rapid and if it loses sight of traditional values, it can release socially disruptive forces.

          The aim of policy must be to achieve balanced and harmonious growth without sacrificing the religious, social and political traditions which have been the foundations of our society for centuries. It is our firm belief that Islam, in all its many aspects, provides the best barrier to the spread of alien and subversive ideas.

          In the turbulent world in which we live, the United States and Saudi Arabia share many common interests. These include the striving for Middle East stability as well as the underpinning of the free world's economy. These common interests presuppose extensive consultation, joint planning and coordinated endeavor.

          After years of doubt and uncertainty the time has come for the United States to act decisively in defense of its security interests in the region. A number of steps would seem to require immediate action.

          1) The U.S. must give notice to the Soviet Union and to the world that certain countries are central to its interests and will be defended at all costs, even at the risk of nuclear war.

          2) To make such determination credible, the U.S. must build up its regional strength in close cooperation with its local partners. It must seek the advice of its historic friends, such as Saudi Arabia, in how best to deploy this strength so as to be able to respond suitably to mutual threats.

          3) Above all, the United States must free its policy from the grave handicap of the unresolved Palestine problem. Since 1973 the United States has embarked on a resolute and determined bid to bring about a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the double objective of stabilizing the region and limiting Soviet influence. But what success has been achieved has created as many problems as it has solved. In particular, the United States' concentration on promoting an Israeli-Egyptian settlement, to the disregard of other states in the region has had the effect of driving a wedge not only between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world, but also between moderate Arab opinion and the United States. What personally surprises me is the fact that most of the elected officials in the U.S, both in the executive and the legislative branches, know the facts that, since the 1973 war, Israel has repeatedly broken international law and has ignored United Nations' resolutions and international opinion. Although these officials admit privately Israel's wrong-doings, publicly they dare not admit it because of the Jewish lobby and because they fear the potential loss of the Jewish vote in their constituencies. American jews, as loyal citizens of the United States, must in the long run realize that unlimited support of Israel threatens their American national interests in the Middle East.

          It is now generally accepted that the establishment of the State of Israel has poisoned all the political relationships in the area - and more particularly the relationship between the Arabs and the West. However, unconditional U.S. support for Israel has also provided the Soviet Union and its local friends with a sorely needed point of entry, allowing them to represent the West as the enemy of the region.

          American security interests in the area are best defended not only by armies or defense pacts, but by implementing policies based on the political realities of the region. There can be no defense of U.S. interests by ignoring the aspirations of a hundred million people. The heart of the problem is the need to recover for Arab sovereignty all the territories captured by Israel in 1967, including solving the Jerusalem problem. There is the parallel need to recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians to a homeland of their own, thereby solving the Palestine problem and bringing a measure of stability to this dangerous region.

          Some Israeli leaders maintain that satisfying Arab requirements Would put Israel's security at risk. This is a grave misjudgement  which, regrettably, some sections of Western opinion appear to share. Israel's long term national security lies in good relations with its neighbors. It cannot secure such relations by continued occupation of Arab lands, implanting its settlements there, and crushing Palestinian aspirations. Building a fort in hostile territory is an invitation to be shot at. Israel's present policies are guarantees of insecurity, not of security.

          Part of the problem is that Israeli and U.S. opinion have never considered Israeli policies from the strict view of that country's security. Instead, legitimate security considerations - and which nation in the world does not wish to live in security? - have been confused with the expansionist designs of mystical Zionism, which claims for Israel land belonging to others.

          By its own admission, United States support for Israel has been "unquestionable" reflected in huge programs of military and financial aid. What has the United States secured in return? U.S. requests for concessions from Israel, notably on the West Bank, have been rebuffed; Israel continues by its ill-treatment of Arab populations in the occupied territories to infringe on human rights; and to add insult to injury, it has managed to convince the U.S. opinion that any concession to Arab rights is a surrender to oil blackmail.

          With the Western world heading for a grave oil crisis, the time has surely come for the United States to look to the protection of its vital financial and raw material interests. These can best be served if the United States restricts its support for Israel within reasonable bounds and not at the expense of Arab interests. Is it unreasonable to ask the United States to exert pressure on their Israeli friends to evacuate all occupied territories and restore the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people in a manner consistent with justice and honor? Only when justice is done to the Palestinians will the Arabs be able to join fully with the United States in the joint defense of their common interests.

          These are the problems and the challenges which Saudi Arabia, the United States and our Western friends are confronted with. We must stretch our minds and our sympathies to create relationships of common understanding so strong, so healthy, and so in tune with the needs and realities of the times, that we can overcome whatever crises that may happen.