zones, it would again be necessary to deploy very large numbers of ground troops with the capability of controlling the more than 1,200 square kilometres covered by each of the 20- kilometre exclusion zones.

K. Security and freedom of movement of UNPROFOR:
the use of force

52. Reference has been made in almost all the preceding subsections of the present report to the dangers to which UNPROFOR and other United Nations personnel are exposed and to the essential importance of freedom of movement for the Force. The current mandate requires UNPROFOR to deploy units in many isolated locations that can be resupplied and rotated only by sending convoys through Bosnian Serb-controlled areas. UNPROFOR must also deploy observers soldiers and civilians in small groups in order to maintain an extensive and flexible liaison and observation network. Although UNPROFOR can protect its personnel to some extent from isolated attacks by uncontrolled elements, its mandate can be performed in relative safety only with the consent and cooperation of all parties.

53. When consent and cooperation are not forthcoming, only limited measures are available to reduce the risks to the Force's personnel, though these all involve ceasing important assigned tasks. Weapons collection points, for example, can be abandoned. UNPROFOR can cease anti-sniping patrols. Larger convoys can be operated, but they will be less frequent and overall delivery rates may be less efficient. Increasing the numbers of personnel deployed at observation posts can improve security to some extent but limits the number of posts that can be occupied, thus reducing the flexibility and extent of UNPROFOR's observation. To forego interpositioning of troops on the confrontation lines would reduce UNPROFOR's ability to prevent and contain fighting at a local level and its capacity to deter attacks on safe areas.

54. These difficulties have caused the Security Council to take a number of decisions under Chapter VII of the Charter. The first such decision, which related to the security of UNPROFOR personnel, was in resolution 807 (1993) and was repeated in subsequent resolutions on the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate. Resolution 847 (1993) and those thereafter extended the application of Chapter VII to the Force's freedom of movement.

55. These references to Chapter VII may have created some ambiguity as to how UNPROFOR should react to a threat to its security or an obstruction of its freedom of movement. The use of force is often the appropriate response to an individual incident. It is not generally realized how often UNPROFOR uses its weapons in self-defence. In a recent week, for instance, 3 anti-tank missiles and over 100 shells were fired for this purpose. But a general pre-emptive use of force to ensure security or freedom of movement would lead to an escalation that would make UNIPROFO R a party to the conflict and place the lives of personnel in danger. The reality, as recognized in resolution 987 (1995), is that there can be no better protection for UNPROFOR than for the parties themselves to recognize their responsibility for ensuring its security and freedom of movement.

56. There is a more general point to be made regarding the use of force. It will be clear from the foregoing analysis of the Security Council's references to Chapter VII that the Security Council did not initially contemplate an enforcement role for the Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Authority for the use of force did not, therefore, go beyond the right of self-defence inherent in any United Nations peace-keeping operation. This was reflected in the level of armament with which troop-contributing countries were asked to equip their

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