contingents and in the arrangements made by the United Nations for the logistic support of the Force This initial decision reflected a recognition that UNPROFOR's deployment on the ground and the tasks that it was to perform could be achieved only with the consent and cooperation of the parties on the basis of mutually acceptable agreements. Neither the operation of Sarajevo airport nor the delivery of aid over great distances and across confrontation lines nor monitoring patrolling and reporting could be achieved without the consent and cooperation of the parties and that consent and cooperation could be assured, in the midst of war only by strict adherence to the peace-keeping principles of impartiality and transparency

57. Subsequently the use of air power was authorized not only for the defence of UNPROFOR personnel but also to deter attacks on the safe areas. UNPROFOR has requested NATO to use its air power on nine occasions when my Special Representative has deemed such action necessary and appropriate. In all cases air power was used against Bosnian Serb targets or targets in Serb-controlled parts of Croatia that had been operating in support of the Bosnian Serbs. On 12 March 1994, close air support was requested when UNPROFOR troops came under fire near Bihac but was not implemented because of bad weather. On I0 and 11 April 1994, close air support was provided near Gorazde, this was the first  occasion on which the Bosnian Serb side retaliated with restrictions on UNPROFOR's freedom of movement. On 5 August 1994, air strikes were made against targets in the Sarajevo exclusion zone. On 22 September 1994, an air strike was made near  Sarajevo following an attack on an UNPROFOR armoured car. On 2I and 23 November 1994, air strikes were made against Udbina airfield in Croatia, which had been used to launch air attacks in the Bihac safe area, and against surface-to-air missiles in western Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Krajina region of Croatia that had threatened NATO aircraft. In retaliation, the Bosnian Serbs detained more than 400 UNPROFOR personnel, whose release was not completed until 13 December 1994 after three weeks of hard negotiation. On 25 and 26 May 1995, air strikes were conducted against targets near Pale, as described in section II above.

58. Experience gained as a result of those incidents has confirmed that great difficulties are involved in the use of air power in support of a peace-keeping operation.The wider political and security implications must therefore be taken fully into account when such action  is contemplated. Using force against only one party, whether directly or through regional arrangements, alters that party's perception of the neutrality of UNPROFOR, with the risk that its personnel and those of other United Nations agencies come to be identified with the use of force and perceived as a party to the war. Being widely dispersed, they become extremely vulnerable to obstruction, detention and other forms of harassment, as has now been demonstrated on three separate occasions (see preceding paragraph). The party concerned can also react by refusing to participate in dialogue and negotiation when these are most needed. A decision to use air power, therefore, requires careful consideration of all these possible consequences and cannot be based on predetermined or automatic criteria. In addition, the existence of separate commands for the forces on the ground and those in the air heightens the risk that actions undertaken by the latter could have unforeseeable consequences for the former. This is why the "dual- key" procedure developed between UNPROFOR and NATO is of such vital importance.

59. The above views on the use of air power and the use of force more generally have been unanimously held by all the Force Commanders of UNPROFOR. Some troopcontributing Governments that initially favoured, or at least were ready to tolerate the use of air power, now express serious reservations about it in the context of

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