65. If that remains the Council's wish, the consequence is that like all peace-keeping operations, UNPROFOR will be able to carry out its mandate only if it enjoys on a continuous basis, the consent and cooperation of the warring parties.Given their lamentable record in this respect, it is important to avoid creating unrealistic expectations of what the Force can achieve. If, as appears to be the case, both of the parties are determined to prosecute the war, the Force's achievements are likely to be rather limited and it may not be costeffective to maintain in Bosnia and Herzegovina a large military force that can be made to appear impotent whenever the parties so choose, with consequent damage to the image and credibility of the Organization.

V. OBSERVATIONS

66. UNPROFOR is not, as many of its critics seem to believe, deployed to end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is a task for the peacemakers, currently led by the members of the "Contact Group", who are supported by the two Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and by my Special Representative. Nor is it an army that has been sent out to fight on one side in the war, though it is often criticized as if it had failed to prosecute a war effectively. It is, instead, a mission deployed by the Security Council to fulfil three purposes. to alleviate the consequences of the war, notably through helping in the provision of humanitarian aid;  to contain the conflict, and mitigate its consequences, by imposing constraints on the belligerents, through the establishment of such arrangements as a "no-fly zone", safe areas and exclusion zones, and to promote the prospects for peace by negotiating local cease- fires and other arrangements, maintaining these where possible and providing support for measures aimed at an overall political settlement. The Force has so far had considerable success in fulfilling these purposes, but they are not an end in themselves.They attempt to produce conditions that will enable the peacemakers to negotiate an overall solution.

67. The parties' readiness to accept UNPROFOR and the constraints it tries to impose on their behaviour depends on how far they perceive it to be promoting a goal that is in their interests. The Force faces two problems in this respect. First, neither party seems to have reached the firm conclusion that it has a better chance of achieving its objectives at the negotiating table than on the battlefield. The result is that UNPROFOR's efforts to reduce the intensity of the conflict can cause it to be seen by the parties as more of a hindrance than a help. Secondly, international efforts to mediate a negotiated solution seem to have come close to a standstill. It is, for instance, more than 16 months since there was a round of negotiations at which all the Bosnian parties were present. None of the options discussed below for adapting the Force's mandate to the realities on the ground will be effective unless there is a real prospect of a negotiated solution in the foreseeable future. It is, therefore, imperative that decisions by the Security Council on the future of UFNPROFOR should be accompanied by a relaunching and intensification of the peace process through a significant new initiative, possibly in a new format. The Council may also wish to start reviewing, at regular intervals, progress made in the negotiations and the implications thereof for UNPROFOR.

68. Meanwhile, UNPROFOR remains deployed in a war situation where, after more than three years, there is still no peace to keep. Its position is further complicated by the fact that its original peace-keeping mandate, which cannot be implemented without the cooperation of the parties, has gradually been enlarged to include elements of enforcement,  which cause it to be seen as a party to the conflict. The safe-areas mandate, for instance,  requires it to cooperate and negotiate daily with a party upon whom it is also expected to

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