call air strikes in certain circumstances. Similarly, the United Nations has imposed sanctions on one party but at the same time has sent out a Force that is obliged to work with the consent and cooperation of that party.The result is that Bosnian Serb leaders have now largely withdrawn their consent and cooperation from UNPROFOR, declaring that they are applying their own "sanctions" to the United Nations in response to United Nations sanctions on them.

69. As a result of these contradictions UNPROFOR now finds itself obstructed, targeted by both sides, denied resupply, restricted in its movements, subjected to constant criticism -in short, in a predicament that my Special Representative. the Theatre Force Commander, many of the troop- contributing Governments and I myself no longer consider tolerable. The extent of the predicament has been highlighted by the air strikes of 2S and 26 May 1995 and their aftermath, which are described in section II above. That crisis now makes it necessary to take urgent measures to release the hostages, to adapt UNPROFOR's mandate and its implementation to the political and operational realities on the ground and, as already noted, to relaunch the peace process.

70. I am extremely concerned that so many UNPROFOR personnel have been detained by the Bosnian Serbs. Their earliest possible release is for me an urgent priority, on which I have been in touch with many world leaders and with my Special Representative. As was learnt in previous such incidents in April and November 1994, this objective is best achieved by negotiation. UNPROFOR therefore continues to maintain the closest possible contact with the Bosnian Serbs in order to monitor the location and welfare of all detainees and obtain their release .In consultation with troop contributors and other interested countries, my Special Representative has communicated with President Milosevic. While demanding from Mr. Karadzic the immediate and unconditional release of the detainees, my Special Representative is monitoring closely the attitude of the Bosnian Serbs so that negotiations can be initiated at the first opportunity. I welcome the support that is being  given to these efforts by the members of the Contact Group and other interested countries and organizations.ICRC is endeavouring to visit detained UNPROFOR personnel.

71. Since my briefing to the Council on 16 May 1995, the events of 2S and 26 May and their aftermath have, as already noted, made even clearer the untenability of UNPROFOR's current situation and the need to clarify whether its role is peace-keeping or enforcement. The Bosnian Serbs' violation of the Sarajevo exclusion zone, their criminal shelling of civilian targets in Tuzla and elsewhere after a carefully measured NATO air strike on a military target and their inexcusable retaliation against United Nations personnel, including unarmed military observers performing liaison duties in Pale, have violently highlighted the conditions in which UNPROFOR has to operate and the dangers inherent in the inconsistencies of its present mandate.

72. After reflecting on these developments and after further consultations with my Special Representative and the Theatre Force Commander, I have somewhat refined the options that I mentioned to the Council on 16 May and I now present the following four options for the Council's consideration:

Option A: To withdraw UNPROFOR, leaving at the most a small political mission, if that was the wish of the parties,

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