Recent events have demonstrated that any option which involves the continuing presence of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina will need to be accompanied by measures, including the possible deployment of additional forces, to provide better security both for UNPROFOR personnel and for the personnel of UNHCR and other civilian agencies that work with it.

73. In considering these options, the Council will also wish to take into account the repercussions that any change in UNPROFOR's mandate and/or method of operation could have on the work of UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. UNHCR's continued role as lead humanitarian agency in providing humanitarian assistance and protection to refugees, to the displaced and to other persons affected by the conflict, while at the same time preparing for the future repatriation of refugees, could require re- evaluation and possibly renegotiation with the parties, depending on the option chosen by the Council.

74. I do not advocate option A.   Recent events have caused some of the Governments contributing troops to UNPROFOR to speak of the possible withdrawal of the Force but none of them has expressed itself in favour of that option if tolerable conditions can be created to permit the Force to continue its operations. I myself took the precaution of writing to the Secretary-General of NATO on 10 February 1995 to ask that NATO prepare plans that would enable it to assist in extricating UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina if withdrawal became unavoidable. A precedent for such multinational assistance for the withdrawal of a United Nations peace- keeping operation has been created in Somalia. NATO's planning is now, I understand, close to completion. But withdrawal is an option of last resort. It would be tantamount to abandonment of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and an admission of the United Nations inability to help to resolve a war in which, to the world's horror, one ethnic group has used force of arms to try to change the ethnic map of a Member State and all parties have, to a greater or lesser extent, been guilty of attacks against civilians and other atrocities. My purpose in the present report, therefore, is to advise the Council on steps that it could take to ensure that UNPROFOR remains in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a better chance than at present of implementing the mandate entrusted to it by the Council.

75. Nor do I advocate option B. The analyses of UNPROFOR's current mandate in section III above and of its possible future role in section IV above indicate why I believe that the Force has become a mission impossible. An attempt to maintain the status quo would further reduce its ability to provide effective help on the humanitarian and political fronts and would bring more United Nations casualties and more damage to the Organization's credibility. I am convinced that, if the decisions taken by the Council in response to the  present report amounted, deliberately or by default, to maintenance of the status quo, the time would soon come when withdrawal of the Force would become inevitable.

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