procedures would be required for its full implementation, assuming a continuing lack of cooperation by the parties. Section IV discusses, in the light of that analysis, the Force's possible future role. Section V contains my observations and presents four options for the Council's consideration

5. In preparing the report, I have borne in mind the sentiment expressed to me in recent weeks by a number of Member States, including members of the Security Council and troop-contributing countries, that the United Nations should remain engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina and that, to make this possible, its existing mandate and/or the way in which it implements that mandate should be adapted. The Member States concerned have made clear that they hold this view notwithstanding the apparent decision of the parties to revert to war, as reflected in many of their actions before and since the expiry on May 1995 of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement of 31 December 1994.

II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SARAJEVO

6.The Sarajevo agreement of February 1994 and the related exclusion zone and weapons collection points facilitated the removal or placement under United Nations control of heavy weapons and were successful in reducing the threat to civilians in the city. The frequency and intensity of fighting along the confrontation line was also reduced to periods of sniping, although machine-guns and anti-tank weapons were employed from time to time. The heavy weapons agreement remained effective, despite occasional violations, as long as both parties refrained from challenging UNPROFOR's limited supervisory capability on the ground and quickly rectified any violations. From the outset, it was clear that recourse to air power in response to violations could lead to serious consequences for UNPROFOR as a whole.

7. During the first year of the agreement, Bosnian Serb forces occasionally removed heavy weapons from United Nations-monitored weapons collection points. With the exception of one incident on 5 August 1994 that required limited use of air power, UNPROFOR was able to rely on negotiations to obtain the return of these heavy weapons. However, the continued lack of diplomatic progress and the breakdown in March 1995 of the 31 December 1994 cessation-of-hostilities agreement caused fighting to spread from the Bihac area to central Bosnia and Tuzla and then to Sarajevo. Bosnian Serb forces increased pressure on the city, by harassing convoys, hijacking United Nations vehicles, closing the airport to humanitarian and civilian traffic, sniping and firing heavy weapons at the Mount Igman road. Government forces were also responsible for a number of incidents.

8. Fighting around the city further intensified after the cessation- of-hostilities agreement expired on 1 May 1995, despite the persistent efforts of my Special Representative to obtain its renewal.Snipers targeted UNPROFOR personnel on a number of occasions. Bosnian Serb attempts to deny use of the Mount Igman road led to a mortar attack on 7 May 1995 that killed 10 military and civilian persons and wounded 30. This incident, and increased fighting in Sarajevo the following day, the heaviest the city had experienced since February 1994, again caused my Special Representative to consider using air power. The decision not to do so was criticized by some Member States. On 16 May 1995, government and Serb forces engaged in heavy fighting around key features that dominate both the city and the Serb-controlled road to Pale.This fighting escalated in intensity, leading to the sustained use of heavy weapons by the two sides, increased civilian and UNPROFOR casualties and mounting calls for stricter enforcement of the exclusion zone. Although UNPROFOR managed to restore some stability, tension continued.

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