76. Option C would require substantial reinforcement of the Force and a change in its mandate so that it could initiate military action when the consent and cooperation of a party was withheld and ensure the protection of its own personnel and those of UNHCR and other civilian agencies if this led to retaliation and further escalation. This could be a viable option to ensure that the Bosnian Serbs and the other parties to the conflict respect the Security Council's decisions. Some of the Governments contributing troops to UNPROFOR have informed me of national plans to deploy additional forces to reduce the vulnerability of UNPROFOR personnel. I welcome these initiatives. But the Governments concerned have also indicated that they are contemplating additional deployments to strengthen UNPROFOR's capacity to carry out its mission. If their intention is that UNPROFOR should use force for this purpose, I do not believe that this would be appropriate for a peace- keeping operation like UNPROFOR It would in my view, be necessary to replace UNPROFOR with a multinational force authorized by the Security Council but under the command of one or more of the countries contributing troops to it as has been the case in Somalia and Haiti. It will be recalled that, on 24 July 1994, I wrote to the President of the Council to express my concern about the viability of UNPROFOR's operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina if the Contact Group countries were to apply by force what were then referred to as "disincentives" to the Bosnian Serbs. I would have similar concerns if the Council decided that UNPROFOR should implement option C.

77. The reasons for this view have been fully argued in the present report. UNPROFOR's current situation is due to the fact that the Bosnian Serbs' failure to cooperate with the Force has led to the gradual addition to its mandate of tasks that are incompatible with its peace-keeping and humanitarian roles. Option C would take UNPROFOR even further across the line dividing peace-keeping from enforcement action. The resulting threats to its security and to its ability to carry out its peace-keeping and humanitarian mandates might to some extent be mitigated by reinforcing it with additional troops and armament. But there would then be the risk that, as with the United Nations Operation in Somalia, the need to concentrate its personnel in larger groups in secure locations would seriously impair its ability to perform its substantive tasks. Nor do I believe that the United Nations currently has the capacity to manage an operation that could involve combat on a considerable scale if, as I fear to be likely, one or other of the parties were to respond to force with force.With unpaid contributions to the UNPROFOR special account currently amounting to $898 million (nearly 80 per cent of a year's expenditure on the Force), there must also be doubts about whether United Nations procedures could ensure the necessary financial support for an operation on the scale that would probably be required.

78. Under option D, the Council would revise UNPROFOR's mandate so that the Force would be required to perform only those tasks that a peace- keeping operation can reasonably be expected to perform in the circumstances prevailing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These would include good offices; liaison and negotiation, monitoring cease- fires, etc. as long as the parties remained willing to implement them, maintaining a presence in the safe areas, after negotiating appropriate regimes for them but without any actual or implied commitment to use force to deter attacks against them, operation of Sarajevo airport with the consent of the parties, facilitating the normalization of life in Sarajevo; escorting humanitarian convoys and supporting other humanitarian activities;  border monitoring, if accepted by the parties; and the use of force, including air power, only in self-defence.

79. This option would probably require some redeployment and could eventually lead to a reduction in the Force's strength. But in the short term some reinforcement on the lines

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