إرشادات مقترحات البحث معلومات خط الزمن الفهارس الخرائط الصور الوثائق الأقسام

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9.On 22 May 1995, Bosnian Serb forces removed two heavy weapons from a weapons collection point On 24 May 1995, fighting erupted again with the Serbs firing heavy weapons from within a number of weapons collection points and the government forces firing from various positions within the city.Bosnian Serb forces removed three more weapons from weapons collection points. Tanks and rocket launchers were also reported within the heavy weapons exclusion zone.Sixteen civilians and military personnel were killed and at least 60 wounded. As previous measures had failed to restore respect for the heavy weapons agreement, and as neither side

appeared ready to stop fighting, UNPROFOR decided to use all available means to restore compliance with the February 1994 agreement.

10. Late on 24 May 1995, my Special Representative issued a statement emphasizing the seriousness of the situation. This was followed by a warning by the Commander of UNPROFOR to the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serb party that their forces would be attacked from the air if all heavy weapons did not cease firing by 1200 hours the next day. Four heavy weapons removed from weapons collection points by the Serbs were also to be returned at the same time. A second deadline, 24 hours later, was established for the removal out of range, or the placement in weapons collection points, of all heavy weapons that had been introduced into the area by the two sides. When issuing this warning, UNPROFOR recognized that non-compliance would require a strong response and that a significant risk to exposed UNPROFOR personnel was likely to result.

11.While all possible protective measures were taken, UNPROFOR had no alternative but to continue its mandated tasks.In any case, many observation posts and weapons collection points were located in Serb-held areas and already subject to strict and detailed control of movement by the Bosnian Serbs. Although it was possible to improve local defences and to suspend resupply convoys, large numbers of exposed personnel could not be withdrawn because of the overriding requirement to maintain observation and liaison. it would also have made little sense to conduct air strikes to achieve the return of a few heavy weapons if the United Nations had no personnel at the weapons collection points to monitor their return; nor would it have made sense to abandon the hundreds of weapons in other sites.

12. The first air strike took place at 1620 hours on 25 May 1995, as a result of the failure of the Bosnian Serbs to respect the deadline for the return of heavy weapons. The target, limited to two bunkers within an ammunition dump near Pale, was selected in order to make an effective strike while reducing the risk of casualties or unnecessary collateral damage. After the strike, Bosnian Serb forces surrounded a number of weapons collection points. All safe areas, except Zepa, were shelled, resulting in particularly heavy casualties in Tuzla, where some 70 civilians were killed and over 130 injured. As the Serbs had again employed heavy weapons around Sarajevo and had still failed to return the missing weapons to weapons collection points, a second attack on the six remaining bunkers in the Pale ammunition dump was conducted at 1030 hours on 26 May 1995. Bosnian Serb forces reacted by surrounding additional weapons collection points, taking United Nations military observers into custody and using a number of them as human shields to deter further air attacks on potential targets and by cutting electricity to the city.

13. Constraints on observation from both the ground and the air made it difficult to verify compliance by both sides with the requirement to clear heavy weapons from the exclusion zone by 1200 hours on 26 May 1995. Relative calm had returned to the city.The

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