situation with respect to UNPROFOR detainees was uncertain and dangerous. For all these reasons, it was decided to review the situation before considering further military action.

14. On 27 May 1995, the Serbs seized an UNPROFOR observation post at the Vrbanja bridge in Sarajevo and detained some United Nations soldiers.The position was recaptured by UNPROFOR at the cost of 2 dead and 14 wounded.There were also Serb casualties.The same day, it became apparent that some UNPROFGR detainees were being moved to other locations.The next day, Bosnian Serb forces detained additional UNPROFOR personnel whose movements had been blocked following the air strikes or who were necessarily deployed at exposed locations in the Gorazde area. As of 30 May 1995, UNPROFOR reported that 199 personnel were detained by the Bosnian Serb forces, many of them in humiliating circumstances and in violation of international norms of military conduct, and that a further 224 were at locations where access and movement were being denied by those forces.

15. Relative calm currently prevails in Sarajevo but this has been achieved at an unavoidable but high cost in detained personnel and in the complete isolation of United Nations forces in the Sarajevo area. UNPROFOR has also lost control over heavy weapons in collection points from which its personnel have been removed and is subjected to further restrictions on its freedom of movement.There has been a complete breakdown in negotiations to reopen Sarajevo airport and utilities are again being cut. The problem of resupply in Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves has been further aggravated. Finally, the ability of United Nations forces to operate effectively, efficiently and safely throughout much of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the basis of impartiality and the consent of all parties, is now seriously compromised.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE MANDATE OF THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION
FORCE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

A. General

16.Since the start of its deployment in Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR's mandate has been plagued by ambiguities that have affected the Force's performance as well as its credibility with the parties, with the members of the Security Council and with the public at large.UNPROFOR is not a peace-enforcement operation and some confusion has arisen as a result of references to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in some Security Council resolutions relating to its mandate, particularly as regards the use of force other than in self-defence.Many of the concerns raised by members of the Council and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the implementation of the mandate reflect this confusion.The analysis that follows therefore pays particular attention to Security Council resolutions containing a reference to Chapter VII.It should be read in conjunction with the detailed analysis previously submitted to the Council in my report of 16 March 1994 (S/1994/300).

17. It will be recalled that, in response to a request from the Security Council, I explored the feasibility of a United Nations peace-keeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the earliest stages of the conflict in that country. In my report of 12 May 1992 (S/23900), I concluded that the conflict was not "susceptible to the United Nations peace-keeping treatment " because of a lack of agreement between the parties. I added that the disrespect for United Nations peace-keepers manifested by the warring factions was already at such a level that "these are  not conditions which permit a United Nations peace-keeping operation to make an effective  contribution".The Council did not at that time proceed with the deployment of a  United Nations peace-keeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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