إرشادات مقترحات البحث معلومات خط الزمن الفهارس الخرائط الصور الوثائق الأقسام

مقاتل من الصحراء


            



(c) To facilitate the unloading of humanitarian cargo and ensure the safe movement of humanitarian aid and related personnel through the establishment of security corridors between the airport and the city;

(d) To verify the withdrawal of anti-aircraft weapons systems from within range of the airport and its approaches and monitor the concentration of artillery, mortar and ground-to-ground missile systems in specified areas to be agreed upon

23. The airlift into Sarajevo organized by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has become the longest-lasting such airlift in aviation history. It has succeeded in delivering more than 150,000 tons of humanitarian relief to the people of Sarajevo and has been an important means of meeting UNPROFOR's logistic needs in that city. However, deteriorating conditions in recent weeks have brought about a situation in which UNPROFOR, denied the cooperation of the parties, is no longer able to ensure the security of the airport and its installations or the uninterrupted continuation of humanitarian operations there. Comparative figures for the number of flights and tons of humanitarian relief delivered in the months of March and April 1993, 1994 and 1995 are as follows:

 

March/April
1993

March/April
1994

 

March/April
1995

 

Flights flown

500

746

241

Tons delivered

2 273

9 934

4 303

24.The principal threat to the security of the airport has been the frequent firings at aircraft using it, mainly by the Bosnian Serb side but also on several occasions by the Bosnian Government side.Unless both sides resume cooperation with UNPROFOR's operations at the airport and desist from firing at aircraft using it, UNPROFOR could ensure its security only by taking military action to deter the use of, or destroy, the weapons concerned. As these are mostly mortars and heavy machine-guns that are easily concealed and quickly moved, this objective could be achieved only by deploying large numbers of ground troops with a mandate to use force against elements believed to be involved in attacks against the airport.The only practical means of keeping the airport functioning, therefore, is to obtain the consent and cooperation of the parties.

D. Humanitarian convoy protection

25. With the further deterioration in the humanitarian situation in Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the period immediately following the deployment of UNPROFOR to Sarajevo airport, the Council, in its resolution 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, called upon "States to take nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the United Nations the delivery by relevant United Nations humanitarian organizations and others of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina".This resolution, which was directed at Member States, did not create any additional mandate for UNPROFOR.

26. Following the adoption of that resolution, a number of Member States proposed that the function identified in it could be added to the mandate of UNPROFOR, operating in accordance with the established principles and practices of United Nations peace-keeping operations.After the London Conference of August 1992, it was agreed by potential troop

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