contributors that, instead of proceeding with the implementation of resolution 770(1992), they would contribute troops to UNPROFOR for this purpose under a new resolution.In my report of 10 September 1992 (S/24540), I noted that, "in providing protective support to UNHCR-organized convoys, the UNPROFOR troops concerned would follow normal peace-keeping rules of engagement.They would thus be authorized to use force in self- defence". I explained that, in this context, self-defence was deemed to include situations in which armed persons attempted by force to prevent United Nations troops from carrying out their mandate. I also pointed out that it was essential that all parties uphold the undertakings they had made and cease forthwith their attacks on United Nations personnel and property. Should this not occur, I suggested that the Council would have to consider what further steps might be necessary to ensure UNPROFOR's security and enable it to fulfil its mandate. The Security Council approved my report in its resolution 776 (1992) and authorized the enlargement of UNPROFOR, without citing Chapter VII of the Charter or authorizing "all measures necessary".

27. It will be recalled from paragraph 20 of document S/1994/300 that UNPROFOR's mandate related to the protection of humanitarian activities has included the following tasks.

(a) To provide support to the efforts of UNHCR to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly through the provision of convoy protection when so requested;

(b) To provide protection for other humanitarian agencies with the approval of UNHCR;

(c) To protect United Nations facilities, including UNHCR storage centres, if so requested;

(d) To provide protection for convoys of released detains on request by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and with the concurrence of the Force Commander that the request is practicable.

28. These tasks have continued to constitute the main demands on UNPROFOR's time and resources in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The difficulties impeding their full implementation have been fully described in many previous reports to the Security Council. They centre essentially on the refusal by the various parties, but specially by the Bosnian Serbs, to respect UNPROFOR's freedom of movement and their readiness in some areas to use humanitarian assistance as a means of furthering their war aims. This can take the form of denying such assistance to populations that the party concerned is trying to drive from their homes. it can also take the form of seizing a proportion of humanitarian cargoes for the party's own use. In spite of these difficulties, UNHCR and UNPROFOR have been successful in meeting the humanitarian requirements in most parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the following table shows, it is mainly in Bihac, and more recently in Sarajevo, that non-cooperation. by the parties has caused major shortfalls in delivery of the targeted assistance:

Percentage of targeted assistance delivered in
various areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
January-April 1995

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