INTRODUCTION

          Military planning during the Cold War was focused on the prospect of a confrontation between the Soviet - led Eastern Bloc and the West, chiefly on the central front in Europe. With the end of the Cold War, this predominant planning focus is shifting and, in its wake, a more complex planning challenge is evolving. As the first major military crisis of the post - Cold War era, the war with Iraq provides a useful opportunity to analyze the planning process.

CENTCOM's New Planning Focus

          From its inception in 1983, the Central Command's ( CENTCOM ) focus had been on a Soviet invasion of Iran. Due to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and a growing appreciation of Iraq as a regional threat, CENTCOM's planning focus changed in the late 1980s. In late 1989, CENTCOM Commander in Chief General H. Norman Schwarzkopf directed CENTCOM to shift the focus of strategic planning for the region to a possible attack by Iraq on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

          The draft contingency plan in place when Iraq invaded Kuwait in the summer of 1990 contained three phases: deterrence of 7 - an Iraqi attack against Saudi Arabia, defense of Saudi Arabia should deterrence fail, and a notional counteroffensive against Iraqi forces. Air and ground operations were integral parts of all phases of the draft plan.

          Prior to the August 2, 1990 Iraqi invasion, only the first two phases of the contingency plan had been developed in any detail. The third phase detailing a counteroffensive remained undeveloped because of the CENTCOM staff's uncertainty as to how the contingency might develop and their inability to define the threat more fully. However, the notional concept for the third phase envisioned added heavy land forces to the lighter defensive forces already in place.

          During the summer of 1990, a crisis simulation or exercise was conducted to test the plan in detail. This exercise involved commanders and staffs from a wide variety of units that would be assigned to CENTCOM in the event of an actual war. The specific plan tested in this exercise focused on a threatened attack by Iraq through Kuwait into Saudi Arabia. That plan provided for deployment of the equivalent of 42 / 3 Army and Marine divisions focused around the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps and a Marine Expeditionary Force. It would be supported by 15 U.S. Air Force tactical fighter squadrons and three U.S. Navy carrier battle groups.

          Based on this exercise, planners recognized that the U.S. force would require additional heavy armored forces in order to counter large Iraqi mechanized forces. Consequently, planners added another heavy division to the contingency plan's order of battle.

          CENTCOM's ability to plan for and ultimately execute with confidence Operation Desert Storm was enhanced by years of U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf region. Significant security assistance programs, land and sea - based prepositioned supplies, and a significant naval presence since the 1987 tanker escorting operations during the Iran -

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