Iraq war are just some examples of the many planning and operational advantages CENTCOM enjoyed.

Planning the Air Campaign

          The draft CENTCOM plan included deployment of air forces into the theater as a deterrent force and, if necessary, to conduct counter-air and air - interdiction operations against Iraqi forces. The planning concept for the U.S. counteroffensive included a strategic air campaign.

          However, the CENTCOM plan did not provide for a specific and detailed air campaign against Iraq. The Operation Desert Storm offensive air campaign plan -- characterized by devastating, simultaneous attacks on political, military and industrial targets in Iraq and on Iraqi forces in Kuwait - did not exist as anything more than a concept prior to August 2, 1990.

          There have been valid criticisms of the pre - war plan's detailed focus on defense and deterrence instead of offensive operations. Although General Schwarzkopf had correctly identified the threat to the region, he decided that the third phase of the plan should remain vague. In hindsight, it would have been better to have planned the strategic air campaign in advance, because the majority of the targets were fixed and could have been identified. Even though aircraft were in theater within days after the invasion, the lack of a detailed offensive plan would have hampered effective air operations had they been required at that time.

          Detailed planning within CENTCOM Headquarters for an air campaign began immediately after August 2, and emphasized a defensive air campaign in the event that Iraq invaded Saudi Arabia. However, it did not take long for air planning to shift to the offense. Within the first week following the decision to deploy U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia, a planning cell within the Air Staff in Washington developed a more detailed approach for a strategic air campaign.

          The Air Staff's approach focused on attacking critical Iraqi " centers of gravity " that, it was hoped, might lead to the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the destruction of Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities. Following a briefing of the conceptual plan with General Schwarzkopf, the concept was further developed, and the Air Staff planning cell was augmented by staff officers from the other services. The plan prepared by the Air Staff was then taken to the theater, where it was used by the Central Command Air Force ( CENTAF ) planning staff as a baseline to develop CENTCOM's more detailed and more focused offensive air campaign plan.

          The plan envisioned a phased application of air power, first to obtain air superiority, then to attack Iraq's command and control and war making potential, and finally, to prepare the battlefield in the Kuwaiti theater of operations ( KTO ). Initially focused on some 84 targets in Iraq and the Kuwaiti theater of operations, the plan had grown to 174 targets by September 13 when General Schwarzkopf decided that the offensive air campaign plan was ready.

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