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U.S. forces, particularly in the air campaign, could have been more effective had there been a greater ability to process and disseminate target and other information, especially the assessment of damage done by allied air strikes.

*

One-target, one-round precision, coupled with long ranges and inadequate ability to distinguish between friend and foe, produced one of the most distressing problems of the war: casualties of friendly fire. U.S. forces lack effective means to distinguish between enemy targets and friendly forces in the midst of battle.

*

In many instances, the readiness rates and operating tempos of primary platforms such as aircraft, tanks and fighting vehicles outpaced the ability of support structures and equipment. For instance, aerial tankers became a limiting factor in air operations.

*

Communications are still plagued by incompatibilities between services, inadequacies between levels of command, as well as by technical limitations.

*

The military effectiveness of our existing defense against tactical ballistic missiles has been questioned. The Patriot antimissile system performed well in its intended role of point defense of installations such as ports and airfields. Most of the questions focus on the issue of how well the Patriot system defended population centers -- a job for which it was not designed.

*

U.S. forces on land and sea continue to be woefully unprepared for mine clearing and breaching operations.

(4)

The Total Force Policy, requiring the integration of reserve components in a major contingency, was a success.

*

The timely provision of combat support and combat service support by reserve components was thoroughly tested and proved vital to victory.

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Service planning was largely preoccupied with mobilization for a war in Europe. Reorienting mobilization planning to address a crisis in Southwest Asia required a hasty, ad hoc effort. For example, Army National Guard combat units - trained and configured for a war in Europe -- mobilized and trained for Operation Desert Storm but were never deployed.

*

The readiness of reserve component units reporting to mobilization stations for deployment to the Persian Gulf varied significantly.

*

In-theater training for reserve components in a crisis such as that in the Persian Gulf cannot be expected to dramatically improve basic combat skills but can assist in training for specific missions.

(5)

The quality and framing of the All Volunteer Force proved instrumental in meeting the demands of a high-speed, high-tech conflict in the harsh environment of Southwest Asia.